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1 Introduction
Family control of business is prevalent around the world, and it is especially
so in developing economies (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer, 1999;
Claessens, Djankov, and Lang, 2000).1 One of the leading theoretical expla-
nations focuses on whether family control of business is a response to weak
contract enforcement (see Bertrand and Schoar, 2006, for a review). Burkart,
Panunzi, and Shleifer (2003) and Caselli and Gennaioli (2005) point out that
while rm owners may want to recruit professional managers to run their
business, they are concerned about the potential expropriation of their prop-
erties by professional managers. Alternatively, rm owners may want to sell
their business to outside investors, but such a transfer of assets hinges upon
the e¢ cient functioning of capital markets. When contract enforcement is
problematic, the managerial incentive contracts designed by rm owners may
not have the de facto power in restraining the opportunistic behavior of pro-
fessional managers. This is further exacerbated by the ine¢ cient managerial
labor market and the disrespect of duciary duties that often accompany
the weak contract enforcement. Similarly, under weak contract enforcement,
capital markets are ine¢ cient, making it di¢ cult for potential investors to
nance their investment on one hand and secure protection of their invest-
ment from expropriation by rm owners on the other. Taken together, weak
contract enforcement leads to a rise of family control of business.
However, empirical evidence regarding the impacts of contract enforce-
ment on family control of business is rather limited. In this paper, we would
like to ll the void by empirically investigating the impacts of contract en-
forcement on family control of business. Our analysis uses the data of Chinas
privately-owned rms. Since China started its economic reform in 1978, there
has been an explosive growth of private rms, mostly individually-owned or
family-owned ones (McMillan and Woodru¤, 2002). Currently, Chinas non-
state sector accounts for around 65% of its GDP and 70-80% of its GDP
growth (CAI JINGMagazine, 2007). Meanwhile, there exist substantial vari-
ations in the e¤ectiveness of the de facto contract enforcement across regions
despite the fact that China is a unitary state with uniform legal codes (e.g.,
Du, Lu and Tao, 2008a; World Bank, 2008). Thus, China o¤ers an ideal
setting to investigate the impacts of contract enforcement on family control
1There is a large literature on family rms, including their nancial performances (e.g.,
Anderson and Reed, 2003; Pérez-González, 2006; Bennedsen, Nielsen, Pérez-González and
D. Wolfenzon, 2007), internal organizations (e.g., Cai, Li, Park, and Zhou, 2007), and
determinants (e.g., Burkart, Panunzi, and Shleifer, 2003; Bhattacharya and Ravikumar,
2003; Ilias, 2006).
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of business.2
Following the literature on family rms (e.g., Anderson and Reeb, 2003;
Villalonga and Amit, 2006, 2007), we measure the degree of family control
of business as the extent to which rm owners make important management
decisions such as operations, wages and benets, human resource manage-
ment, and long-term corporate decisions. And we measure the e¤ectiveness
of contract enforcement as the willingness of private rms to use courts to
resolve business disputes (e.g., North, 1991; Cull and Xu, 2005).
Our ordinary least squares regression results show that the e¤ectiveness
of contract enforcement has a negative and statistically signicant impact
on the degree of family control of business, which is consistent with the
theoretical predictions of Burkart, Panunzi, and Shleifer (2003) and Caselli
and Gennaioli (2005).
This result, however, could be biased due to some omitted variables and
reverse causality issues. We then control for a host of variables related to
rm and rm owners characteristics, region characteristics, and industry
dummies, and nd that our results are robust to these controls. To alleviate
the concern of reverse causality, we use the regional average of other rms
perceptions regarding the e¤ectiveness of contract enforcement, and nd that
our results still hold. To further address potential endogeneity problems, we
use the instrumental variable method. Following La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes,
Shleifer, and Vishny (1997, 1998), we use legal origin (i.e., an indicator of
whether a region was administered by Great Britain in the late Qing Dy-
nasty) as an instrument for contract enforcement. The instrumental variable
estimation results show that weaker contract enforcement causes rms to be
more family-controlled.
The validity of our instrumental variable estimation hinges upon the sat-
isfaction of two conditions: the relevance condition and the exclusion restric-
tion. The relevance condition is conrmed by the highly signicant corre-
lation between the instrumental variable and the e¤ectiveness of contract
enforcement, and by the result of the Anderson canonical correlation LR sta-
tistic. Meanwhile, the large Shea partial R-squared and the Cragg-Donald
2Indeed, there is anecdotal evidence suggesting the linkage between poor contract en-
forcement and the prevalence of family control of business in China. There are many
examples indicating that rm owners and professional managers have disputes about in-
centive payments agreed upon ex ante, resulting in the departure of professional managers
in the middle of their contracts (Li, 2006). Even worse, there are cases where the profes-
sional managers hired by family rms breach their employment contracts by taking away
clienteles and setting up competing businesses (Dai, 2007). In general, the fulllment of
the duciary duties of professional managers is a big concern to rm owners, especially in
the less developed regions of China.
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F-statistic rule out the concern for the weak instrumental variable. With
regard to the exclusion restriction, we conduct a test following Acemoglu,
Johnson, and Robinson (2002). Specically, if the instrumental variable af-
fects the degree of family control of business only through the channel of
contract enforcement, then the instrumental variable should not have any
statistically signicant impact when it is included together with the contract
enforcement index in the regressions. Our results remain robust with this
exclusion test, implying that our instrumental variable estimation is valid.
For further robustness checks, we use an alternative instrumental vari-
able, adopt two methods to investigate if our results are biased due to the
sample attrition problem, focus on a sub-sample of rms with their main
owners having 100% equity shares, and nally control for three alternative
explanations for the family control of business.
Our study is related to the recent literature on the importance of economic
institutions for economic growth (e.g., Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson,
2001, 2002), incentives for investment (e.g., Besley, 1995; Johnson, McMillan,
and Woodru¤, 2002), and corporate decisions (e.g., Laeven and Woodru¤,
2007; Du, Lu, and Tao, 2008b).
The remainder of the study is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces
the data and variables for the empirical study, while Section 3 presents our
main empirical results. The paper concludes with Section 4.
2 Data and Variables
The data set used in this study is from the Survey of Chinas Private En-
terprises conducted in 2002. This survey is conducted jointly by the United
Front Work Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party
of China, the All China Industry and Commerce Federation, and the China
Society of Private Economy at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. To
achieve a balanced representation across all regions and industries in China,
the survey uses the multi-stage stratied random sampling method. The to-
tal number of private rms to be surveyed is rst determined. After this, six
cities/counties are selected from each of the 31 regions (i.e., 22 provinces, 4
province-level municipalities, and 5 minority autonomous regions), which in-
clude the capital city of the region, one prefecture-level city, one county-level
city, and three counties. Next, the number of private rms to be surveyed
in each region is determined by the product of the percentage of the regions
share of private rms in the national total and the total number of private
rms in the survey. The same method is used to determine the number of
sample rms in every city/county and industry. Finally, private rms are
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randomly chosen for each sub-sample. The data set contains 3,258 initial
observations, which represents 0.16% of the total number of privately-owned
rms nationwide by the end of 2001.
The dependent variables of this study are about the degree of family
control of business. In the survey, there are four questions related to the
degree of family control, (i) who makes the operations decisions, (ii) who
makes decisions on wages and benets for the employees, (iii) who makes
the human resource management decisions, and (iv) whether rm owner or
his relatives are required for the long-term development of the rm.3 The
possible answers for the rst three questions are, the rm owner himself,
the board of directors, the rm owner and the senior management, the rm
owner and other organizations, the management, and others. We construct
three dummy variables, Operations Decisions, Wages and Benets, and HRM
Decisions, corresponding to the rst three questions, taking a value of 1 if
the reply is the rm owner himselfand 0 otherwise. Meanwhile, a dummy
variable, Long-term Development, is constructed corresponding to the fourth
question, taking a value of 1 if the reply is a¢ rmative and 0 otherwise.
To have comprehensive characterizations of family control of business, we
use the principal component and the simple average of the four variables dis-
cussed above, and construct two variables (Family Control_pc and Family
Control_average) accordingly. The correlations of the four component mea-
sures of family control as well as the two comprehensive measures of family
control are shown in Table 1.
Table 2 shows the pattern of family control of business in China.4 Clearly,
there are signicant variations in each of the four component measures of
family control of business across Chinas regions. For the variable Operations
Decisions, Hainan has the highest degree of family control (with a mean value
of 0.674), followed by Liaoning (0.616) and Yunnan (0.521), whereas Beijing
has the lowest degree of family control (0.228), followed by Jilin (0.276) and
Chongqing (0.286). Meanwhile, Liaoning has the highest percentage of rm
owners making decisions onWages and Benets (0.598), followed by Hainan
(0.533) and Shanxi (0.500), whereas Hubei has the lowest percentage (0.183),
followed by Beijing (0.186) and Chongqing (0.196). As for HRM Decisions,
Liaoning has the highest degree of family control (0.640), followed by Shanxi
(0.560) and Hainan (0.543), whereas Chongqing has the lowest degree (0.232),
followed by Beijing (0.236) and Hubei (0.274). For the variable Long-term
3The respondent of the survey is the rm owner, who may or may not have 100%
ownership of the rm.
4Tibet is excluded due to its sharply di¤erent business environment from other regions.
However, our main results remain robust to the inclusion of Tibet presumably because of
the small sample size of rms in Tibet.
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Development, Hainan has the highest percentage of family control (0.630),
followed by Xinjiang (0.521) and Yunnan (0.500), whereas Jiangxi has the
lowest percentage (0.211), followed by Gansu (0.241) and Chongqing (0.250).
Referring to the comprehensive measures of family control (i.e., Family Con-
trol_pc and Family Control_average), Liaoning, Hainan, and Yunnan are the
three regions with the highest degree of family control of business, whereas
Beijing, Chongqing, and Hubei are the three regions with the lowest degree.
Meanwhile, there are signicant variations in the degree of family control
of business across rms in terms of both size and age, with larger and older
rms having lower degrees of family control. Finally, the last row of Table 2
shows that the percentage of rm owners involved in the decision on Wages
and Benets is the lowest (0.351) among the four component measures of
family control of business, whereas the percentage of Operations Decisions is
the highest (0.402).
Our key independent variable is the e¤ectiveness of contract enforcement.
In the survey, there is a question on whether a rm would like to use courts
to resolve business disputes. A variable denoted by Contract Enforcement is
constructed accordingly, taking a value of 1 if the reply is a¢ rmative and 0
otherwise. Note that only 862 out of 3,258 rms responded to this question,
thereby reducing the sample size in our regression analysis. Table 3 shows
the pattern of family control of business in China in the regression sample,
which are similar to those of the full sample reported in Table 2. Moreover,
in the regression analysis, using two methodologies à la Duo (2001) and
Wooldridge (2002, 2007), we will conrm that our results are not biased
due to the sample attrition with regard to the mis-reporting of contract
enforcement.
It is important to note that there are signicant variations in the e¤ec-
tiveness of contract enforcement across Chinas region despite China being
a unitary state with uniform laws and national ordinances. The mean value
of Contract Enforcement is 0.860 with a standard deviation of 0.348 in our
sample.
O¢ cially, China has a centralized legal structure, with the National Peo-
ples Congress (NPC) having the sole power to enact laws and national or-
dinances. However, due to substantial variations in endowments, socioeco-
nomic development, and culture across regions as well as the fast-changing
socioeconomic environment as experienced during Chinas economic transi-
tion, the laws and national ordinances enacted by the NPC tend to be sketchy
and need to be modied in order to be more applicable to local circumstances
(Eggleston, Posner, and Zeckhauser, 2000). Meanwhile, the legal system in
China comprises of four levels of courts: the Supreme Peoples Court at the
national level, the Higher Level Peoples Courts at the regional level, and the
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Intermediate Level and Basic Level Peoples Courts at the local level. Despite
the systems self-image as one in which courts only apply law and national
ordinances, all these four levels of courts are capable of issuing rules and
regulations purporting to be binding on various parties to varying degrees
(e.g., Chen, 2004; Clarke, Murrell, and Whiting, 2005).
In issuing rules and regulations with respect to laws and national ordi-
nances, however, local courts (i.e., Higher Level, Intermediate Level, and
Basic Level Peoples Courts) are vulnerable to the inuences of respective
local governments, and they are pressured to make rulings in favor of local
rms and industries in lawsuits, which involves parties outside local jurisdic-
tions (e.g., Zheng, 1988; Shi, 1989). This is because the power to appoint and
dismiss court personnel is lodged in the local Peoples Congress, and local
courts rely on local governments for their nance (Zhao, Zhou, Zhang, Qi, and
Wang, 1989). Meanwhile, as local courts are short of autonomous enforce-
ment powers in China, the enforcement of rulings, especially those against lo-
cal rms and industries, hinges upon the cooperation of local authorities such
as local public security bureaus (e.g., Fan, 1985; Lieberthal and Oksenberg,
1988; Zhao, 1989; Li, Zhang, and Wang, 1990; Clarke, 1991). As a result,
there are substantial variations in the interpretation and enforcement of laws
and national ordinances enacted by the central government across Chinas
various regions (e.g., Tai, 1957; Cheng, Liu and Cheng, 1982; Yearbook of
Peoples Court, 1990; Clarke, 1996, 2005). Indeed, a World Bank survey
conducted in 2008 reveals substantial di¤erences in the e¢ ciency of courts
to resolve business disputes across Chinas regions. For example, in coastal
cities, it takes an average of 230 days to resolve an uncomplicated commer-
cial dispute, whereas the corresponding number for Northeastern China is
363 days (World Bank, 2008).
In the empirical analysis, we also control for other factors that might
possibly a¤ect the degree of family control of business, including rm and rm
owners characteristics, regional characteristics, and industry dummies. The
rm characteristics include Firm Size (measured by the logarithm of total
sales) and Firm Age (measured by the logarithm of years of establishment by
the end of 2001). The rm owners characteristics include his human capital,
Education (years of formal schooling), Age (the age of the rm owner by the
end of 2001), and Gender (a dummy variable taking a value of 1 if the rm
owner is a male and 0 otherwise); and his political capital, CPC Membership
(a dummy variable taking a value of 1 if the rm owner is a member of
the Chinese Peoples Congress and 0 otherwise) and CPPCC Membership
(a dummy variable taking a value of 1 if the rm owner is a member of the
Chinese Peoples Political Consultative Conference and 0 otherwise). Finally,
we included industry dummy and the logarithm of regional GDP per capita to
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account for the possible di¤erences in the degree of family control of business
across industries and regions.
As a way of controlling for the problem of reverse causality, for each rm,
we use the regional average of other rmsperceptions on the e¤ectiveness
of contract enforcement. To further address potential endogeneity issues, we
follow the literature (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1997,
1998) and use legal origin as an instrumental variable for the e¤ectiveness of
contract enforcement. Specically, it is a dummy variable (denoted by British
Administration) indicating whether the respective region was administered
by Great Britain in the late Qing Dynasty (details will be provided below in
Section 3.4).
Finally, to examine other possible explanations for the degree of family
control of business, we construct three variables: Entrepreneurship of Family
Members (the fraction of the rm owners grandfather, father, mother, and
spouse being self-employed), Diversication (a categorical variable taking a
value of 0 if the rm engages in only one business, a value of 1 if the rm
engages in two businesses, a value of 2 if the rm engages in three businesses,
and a value of 3 if the rm engages in four businesses), and Di¢ cult to Find
Reliable Managers (a dummy variable taking a value of 1 if the answer to
the Survey question whether it is di¢ cult for rm owner to nd reliable
professional managersis a¢ rmative and 0 otherwise).
The summary statistics of all key variables are given in Table 4.
3 Empirical Analysis
3.1 Benchmark Results
To investigate the impacts of the e¤ectiveness of contract enforcement on the
degree of family control of business, we estimate the following equation:
yf = i +   Contract Enforcementf +   Logarithm of GDP per capitar
+Xf 0 + "f (1)
where yf measures the degree of family control of business for rm f in region
r and industry i, Contract Enforcementf is the perception regarding the
e¤ectiveness of contract enforcement by rm f in region r and industry i,
i is the industry dummy, Xf is a vector of control variables, and "f is a
random error term. To deal with the possible heteroskedasticity, standard
errors are clustered at the industry/region level.
The benchmark estimation results with both industry dummies and the
logarithm of GDP per capita included are presented in Table 5. Columns 1-4
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are the Probit regression results for the four component measures of family
control of business: Operations Decisions, Wages and Benets, HRM Deci-
sions, and Long-term Development. Clearly, the degree of family control of
business along with each of these four dimensions is negatively and statisti-
cally signicantly correlated with the e¤ectiveness of contract enforcement.
As shown in Columns 5-6 of Table 5, similar results are found for the two
comprehensive measures of family control of business: Family Control_pc
(principal component of the four component measures) and Family Con-
trol_average (simple average of the four component measures). Specically,
a one-standard-deviation increase in the e¤ectiveness of contract enforce-
ment leads to a 0.153-standard-deviation decrease in Family Control_pc and
a 0.159-standard-deviation decrease in Family Control_average.
3.2 Multivariate Analysis
The above benchmark regression results could be biased due to the lack
of control for omitted variables and reverse causality issues. In Table 6, we
control for a host of variables related to rm and rm owners characteristics.
Columns 1-2 of Table 6 report the results for Family Control_pc when the
rm owners and rm characteristics are added stepwise along with industry
dummies and the logarithm of GDP per capita. To deal with the concern
that the results could still be biased due to the cross-regional variations in in-
dustrial structure, in Column 3, we use the industry/region dummies instead
of industry dummies and the logarithm of GDP per capita.5 In Columns
4-5, we repeat the analysis in Columns 2-3 using Family Control_average
as a measure of the degree of family control of business. Clearly, our previ-
ous results on the negative correlation between the e¤ectiveness of contract
enforcement and the degree of family control of business remain robust to
these controls. Meanwhile, the estimated coe¢ cients of control variables also
make economic sense. For example, rm owners with better education prefer
to have less family control of their businesses, larger rms are less likely to
be family controlled, and rms located in more developed regions have lower
degrees of the family control of business.
5We thank an anonymous referee for pointing out the concern that the estimation
results could be biased due to the variations in industrial structure across Chinas regions.
The inclusion of the interaction terms between industry and region dummies is meant to
address this concern, though not perfectly.
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3.3 Region-Level Analysis
To alleviate the concern of reverse causality, for each rm, we use the regional
average of other rmsperceptions on the e¤ectiveness of contract enforce-
ment as the explanatory variable, and repeat the estimations. As shown in
Table 7, rms in regions with weaker contract enforcement are found to have
higher degrees of family control.
3.4 Instrumental Variable Estimation
It could still be argued that endogeneity issues remain. For example, we
may not exhaust all possible variables that correlate with both the degree
of family control of business and the e¤ectiveness of contract enforcement.
Meanwhile, rms with higher degrees of family control rely more on their
family reputations for doing business with other rms, thus having less need
for improvements of e¤ective contract enforcement in their regions.
To further deal with these endogeneity problems, we use the instrumental
variable estimation as a robustness check. Motivated by the recent literature
on economic institutions (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny,
1997 and 1998; Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson, 2001, 2002), we look
back into the Chinese history for suitable instruments. Specically, we use a
dummy variable indicating whether the respective region was administered by
Great Britain in the late Qing Dynasty as an instrument for the e¤ectiveness
of contract enforcement. We compile historical information on the control of
Chinas regions by foreign powers from relevant texts on the modern history
of China such as the works of McAleavy (1967) and Dong, Zhang, and Jiao
(2000).
During the late Qing Dynasty (1840-1911), China was defeated in a se-
ries of wars against foreign powers, including two Opium Wars with Great
Britain, the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95, and the Boxer Rebellion. In the
wake of military defeats, the Qing government was forced to sign unequal
treaties including territorial concessions. The wave of territorial partition-
ing climaxed at the end of the 19th century, with Great Britain governing
regions along the Yangtze River (Guizhou, Sichuan, Hubei, Hunan, Jiangxi,
Anhui, Jiangxu, Henan, and Zhejiang), France governing Yunnan, Hainan,
Guangxi, and the majority of Guangdong, Germany governing Shandong,
Japan governing Fujian, and Russia governing Xinjiang, Mongolia, and the
three north-eastern provinces (Qian, 1948). Shanghai and Tianjin, the two
leading commercial centers of China at that time, were divided into various
foreign concessions.
Within their respective domains of control, the foreign powers e¤ectively
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established their sovereign authorities (McAleavy, 1967). Typically, the for-
eign powers imposed their own civil and military administration, including
in partically their own legal systems (Dong, Zhang, and Jiao 2000). As a
result, law suits taking place in the domains controlled by the foreign powers
were adjudicated using the legal systems of the respective reigning foreign
powers (e.g., Yang and Ye, 1993; Tan, 1996). The foreign powers imposed
their legal systems by force, and hence the legal systems could be considered
as exogenous to the local community.
The foreign powers had di¤erent legal systems, with Great Britain using
the common law system and France, Germany, Japan, and Russia adopting
the civil law system. It has been shown that the common law system supports
private market outcomes while the civil law system imposes state-desired al-
locations, implying di¤erent types of social control of business (Damaka,
1986; Pistor, 2006; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer, 2008). As a
result, the common law system is associated with greater judicial indepen-
dence (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silances, Pop-Eleches, and Shleifer, 2004), less
formalism of judicial procedures (Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and
Shleifer, 2003) and fewer judicial biases (Gennaioli, 2009) than the civil law
system, which in turn leads to more e¤ective contract enforcement under the
common law system than that under the civil law system (Acemoglu and
Johnson, 2005; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer, 2008).
The imposition of the legal systems by the foreign powers in various parts
of China in the late Qing Dynasty was expected to inuence not only the
legal rules, but also the legal institutions (including judicial independence
and legal procedures), and human capital and beliefs of the key participants
in the legal systems (Zweigert and Kötz, 1998; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes,
and Shleifer, 2008). Indeed, the foreign powers in China were actively en-
gaged in transplanting and cultivating their beliefs and ideologies to the local
people by setting up and operating schools and colleges. Speaking at the Sec-
ond Protestantism Propagators Congress held in Shanghai in China in 1890,
F.L. Hawks Pott, President of Saint Johns University, declared that "in our
school, we trained Chinas future teachers and propagators, making them the
leaders and comperes in the future and casting the greatest inuences on the
future China" (Yang and Ye 1993).
The legal institutions, human capital and beliefs that were transplanted
and cultivated by di¤erent foreign powers are expected to persist over time
(Zweigert and Kötz, 1998; Balas, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer,
2009). Indeed, there is a growing body of literature on the persistence of cul-
ture, beliefs, and ideologies over time (e.g., Bisin and Verdier, 2000; Dohmen,
Falk, Hu¤man, and Sunde, 2006; Tabellini, 2007a, 2007b, 2008).
Given that the contract enforcement is more e¤ective under the common
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law system used by Great Britain than under the civil law system used by
France, Germany, Japan, and Russia, we therefore take whether a region of
China was administered by Great Britain during the late Qing Dynasty as a
reasonable instrument for the e¤ectiveness of contract enforcement in 2001.6
The instrumental variable estimation results are summarized in Table
8. As shown in Panel B, the instrumental variable (British Administration)
is positively and statistically signicantly correlated with the e¤ectiveness
of contract enforcement, which is consistent with our above argument of
the relevance on the instrumental variable. Columns 1-2 in Panel A report
the second-stage estimation results, when Family Control_pc and Family
Control_average are used as the dependent variable, respectively. The results
reinforce our earlier ndings and show that weaker contract enforcement
causes rms to be more family-controlled.
The validity of our instrumental variable estimation hinges upon the satis-
faction of the relevance condition and the exclusion restriction. The relevance
condition is conrmed by the highly signicant correlation between the in-
strumental variable and the e¤ectiveness of contract enforcement (Panel B
of Table 8), and the result of the Anderson canonical correlation LR statistic
(Panel C of Table 8). Meanwhile, the concern for the weak instrument is ruled
out by the large Shea partial R-squared and the result of the Cragg-Donald
F-statistic (Panel C of Table 8).7
With regard to the exclusion restriction (i.e., the instrument variable does
not a¤ect family control of business through channels other than contract
enforcement), we carry out a test following Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson
(2002). This test is based on the premise that if the instrumental variable
a¤ects family control of business only through contract enforcement, then
the instrumental variable should not have any signicant impact on family
control of business conditional on the e¤ectiveness of contract enforcement.
Indeed, as shown in Columns 3-4 of Table 8, the instrumental variable has a
negative and signicant impact on family control of business when it is used
as the explanatory variable, but its signicance disappears when Contract
Enforcement is included as an additional explanatory variable.
For a further robustness check, we use an alternative instrumental vari-
able. Specically, we take the view that the e¤ectiveness of contract en-
6The classication of the legal origin for Shanghai and Tianjin requires some extra care
because these two municipalities were occupied by several foreign powers. As over 60% of
Shanghais territories were occupied by Great Britain, it is classied to be administrated
by Great Britain. Tianjin, however, is classied to be not administrated by Great Britain
because only about 20% of its territories were occupied by Great Britain.
7The Cragg-Donald F-statistic values for our regressions are signicantly above the
value of 10, which is considered as the critical value by Staiger and Stock (1997).
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forcement perceived by a rm is comprised of two components, a regional
component and a rm-specic component. The rst component is common
to all rms located in the same region, while the second component captures
the idiosyncratic factors specic to each rm. More importantly, since the
regional component of contract enforcement is determined by the underlying
factors at the regional level, such as the behavior of local government o¢ -
cials and the capability of local judges, it is thus exogenous to the rm. This
enables us to use the regional average of other rmsperceptions on the ef-
fectiveness of contract enforcement as an instrument.8 As shown in Column
5 of Table 8, our main results are robust to this alternative instrumental
variable estimation.
Overall, our instrumental variable estimation results show that the e¤ec-
tiveness of contract enforcement has a negative and signicant causal e¤ect
on the degree of family control of business.
3.5 Robustness Checks
Recall that there is a substantial attrition in sample size because a lot of
rms do not answer the question regarding the e¤ectiveness of contract en-
forcement. This may raise the concern that our estimation results could be
biased due to this sample attrition problem, that is, rms that answer the
question could be di¤erent from those that do not.9 To address this possible
concern, we use two recently developed methodologies on sample attrition
bias. First, following Duo (2001), we estimate the propensity of a rm to
answer the survey question regarding contract enforcement based on rm and
rm owners characteristics, and then include the polynomial terms of the
propensity in the main specication. Second, we use the inverse-probability-
weighted (IPW) method developed by Wooldridge (2002, 2007), in which the
inverse of the estimated propensity is used as the sample weight in the main
specication. The estimation results using these two methods (reported in
Table 9) show that contract enforcement still has a negative and statistically
signicant impact on the degree of family control of business, thereby ruling
out the concern of sample attrition bias.
Next, we restrict our analysis to the subsample of rms, the main owner
of which has 100% share of the rm. Firm owners in this subsample presum-
ably worry more about the expropriation of their properties by professional
managers and face greater di¢ culties in selling their companies to outside
investors. The results are shown in Table 10, where Family Control_pc and
8Fisman and Svensson (2007), for instance, use the same approach to construct instru-
mental variables.
9We thank an anonymous referee for pointing out this problem.
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Family Control_average are used as the dependent variable in Columns 1-2,
respectively. Clearly, our results are robust to this subsample.
For further robustness checks, we control for explanations for family con-
trol of business other than the contract enforcement argument. One hypoth-
esis is that rm owners may have innate capabilities for running business,
and hence are more likely to have family control of business (Demsetz and
Lehn, 1985). A proxy for such innate capabilities of rm owners is the entre-
preneurship of their family members.10 Meanwhile, it has been argued that
rms with a greater need for external nance may have to sell their shares to
outside investors, thereby diluting their family control of business (Burkart,
Panunzi, and Shleifer, 2003). A proxy for the need for external nance is the
degree of corporate diversication (i.e., the number of business segments).
Moreover, in developing countries such as China where the managerial labor
market is underdeveloped, rm owners may encounter di¢ culties in identi-
fying and retaining reliable professional managers, hence the high degree of
family control of business.
To control for these alternative explanations for family control of busi-
ness, we include Entrepreneurship of Family Members (the fraction of the
rm owners grandfather, father, mother, and spouse being self-employed),
Diversication (the number of business segments), and Di¢ cult to Find Reli-
able Managers (an indicator of di¢ culty in nding reliable professional man-
agers) individually and collectively, and report the regression results in Table
11. It is found that Contract Enforcement always has a negative and sta-
tistically signicant impact on the degree of family control of business. Of
the three alternative explanations for the family control of business, we nd
support for Diversication and Di¢ cult to Find Reliable Managers, but not
Entrepreneurship of Family Members.
4 Conclusion
Family control of business is a widely-observed phenomenon in developing
economies. One of the leading theories suggests that it is a response to weak
contract enforcement in such economies (Burkart, Panunzi, and Shleifer,
2003; Caselli and Gennaioli, 2005). However, empirical evidence on the rele-
vance of this theory remains limited.
In this paper, using a sample of Chinas private rms, we investigate the
impacts of contract enforcement on the degree of family control of business.
10Recent studies by Djankov, Qian, Roland, and Zhuravskaya (2006a, 2006b) nd
that entrepreneurs in China tend to have more entrepreneurs in their families than non-
entrepreneurs.
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We nd that weaker contract enforcement is associated with a higher degree
of family control of business. To alleviate the concern that our results could
be biased due to omitted variables and reverse causality, we experiment with
a host of control variables and a regional level measure of the e¤ectiveness of
contract enforcement, and nd that our results are robust. Furthermore, we
use the instrumental variable estimation to deal with the possible endogeneity
problems, and establish that weaker contract enforcement causes rms to be
more family-controlled. The results of this study highlight the importance
of economic institutions on corporate decisions in developing economies.
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Table 1: Correlations between various measures of family control of business 
 
  
Operations 
Decisions 
Wages 
and 
Benefits 
HRM 
Decisions 
Long-term 
Development
Family 
Firm_pc 
Family 
Firm_average 
Operations Decisions 1.0000      
Wages and Benefits 0.7472 1.0000     
HRM Decisions 0.7283 0.7809 1.0000    
Long-term Development 0.3604 0.3725 0.3266 1.0000   
Family Firm_pc 0.8886 0.9104 0.8935 0.5524 1.0000  
Family Firm_average 0.8704 0.8883 0.8699 0.6319 0.9951 1.0000
 
  
Table 2: Patterns of family control of business in China (full sample) 
 
 
Operations 
Decisions 
Wages and 
Benefits 
HRM 
Decisions 
Long-term 
Development
Family 
Firm_pc 
Family 
Firm_average
Across Regions 
Beijing 0.228 0.186 0.236 0.277 -0.640 0.229
Tianjin 0.326 0.283 0.311 0.356 -0.258 0.322
Hebei 0.391 0.305 0.367 0.391 -0.091 0.363
Shanxi 0.500 0.500 0.560 0.380 0.462 0.485
Inner Mongolia 0.520 0.500 0.540 0.327 0.460 0.480
Liaoning 0.616 0.598 0.640 0.445 0.848 0.578
Jilin 0.276 0.379 0.393 0.370 -0.212 0.333
Heilongjiang 0.441 0.441 0.492 0.458 0.305 0.458
Shanghai 0.360 0.292 0.335 0.309 -0.256 0.318
Jiangsu 0.431 0.371 0.389 0.434 0.083 0.406
Zhejiang 0.438 0.398 0.458 0.437 0.199 0.432
Anhui 0.310 0.268 0.338 0.420 -0.205 0.341
Fujian 0.324 0.282 0.380 0.338 -0.155 0.345
Jiangxi 0.385 0.333 0.282 0.211 -0.253 0.309
Shandong 0.382 0.366 0.371 0.433 0.008 0.389
Henan 0.467 0.419 0.467 0.397 0.254 0.441
Hubei 0.318 0.183 0.274 0.265 -0.467 0.269
Hunan 0.342 0.263 0.459 0.378 -0.152 0.347
Guangdong 0.393 0.348 0.404 0.413 0.010 0.387
Guangxi 0.341 0.366 0.390 0.366 -0.066 0.366
Hainan 0.674 0.533 0.543 0.630 0.820 0.589
Chongqing 0.286 0.196 0.232 0.250 -0.578 0.241
Sichuan 0.333 0.345 0.341 0.298 -0.233 0.320
Guizhou 0.370 0.326 0.326 0.359 -0.157 0.345
Yunnan 0.521 0.479 0.500 0.500 0.476 0.500
Shaanxi 0.487 0.387 0.480 0.347 0.204 0.425
Gansu 0.448 0.345 0.483 0.241 0.044 0.379
Qinghai  0.500 0.200 0.300 0.400 -0.160 0.350
Ningxia 0.417 0.292 0.292 0.435 -0.082 0.370
Xinjiang 0.396 0.375 0.438 0.521 0.164 0.432
Across Firm Size 
Small (bottom quarter) 0.586 0.554 0.579 0.519 0.739 0.560
Medium (second quarter) 0.439 0.374 0.414 0.425 0.125 0.415
Large (third quarter) 0.339 0.282 0.331 0.320 -0.277 0.315
Very Large (top quarter) 0.290 0.238 0.291 0.303 -0.421 0.281
Across Firm Age 
Less than 10 years 0.368 0.322 0.355 0.362 -0.137 0.350
More than 10 years 0.424 0.369 0.418 0.396 0.085 0.403
Mean 0.402 0.351 0.394 0.383 0.000 0.383
Table 3: Patterns of family control of business in China (regression sample) 
 
 
Operations 
Decisions 
Wages and 
Benefits 
HRM 
Decisions 
Long-term 
Development
Family 
Firm_pc 
Family 
Firm_average
Across Regions 
Beijing 0.217 0.109 0.174 0.283 -0.796 0.196
Tianjin 0.100 0.100 0.100 0.000 -1.212 0.075
Hebei 0.452 0.387 0.581 0.290 0.239 0.427
Shanxi 0.250 0.125 0.250 0.250 -0.680 0.219
Inner Mongolia 0.571 0.643 0.500 0.143 0.475 0.464
Liaoning 0.667 0.611 0.717 0.453 1.053 0.625
Jilin 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.250 -1.376 0.063
Heilongjiang 0.077 0.154 0.154 0.462 -0.797 0.212
Shanghai 0.209 0.186 0.190 0.247 -0.744 0.202
Jiangsu 0.328 0.262 0.252 0.341 -0.356 0.300
Zhejiang 0.333 0.289 0.444 0.422 -0.065 0.372
Anhui 0.375 0.333 0.333 0.478 -0.001 0.391
Fujian 0.167 0.160 0.280 0.280 -0.648 0.227
Jiangxi 0.667 0.444 0.444 0.000 0.191 0.389
Shandong 0.294 0.294 0.294 0.309 -0.346 0.298
Henan 0.273 0.364 0.273 0.455 -0.213 0.341
Hubei 0.333 0.200 0.400 0.286 -0.236 0.321
Hunan 0.273 0.273 0.500 0.455 -0.042 0.375
Guangdong 0.333 0.352 0.370 0.389 -0.097 0.361
Guangxi 0.167 0.167 0.167 0.083 -0.930 0.146
Hainan 0.429 0.308 0.429 0.429 -0.079 0.365
Chongqing 0.143 0.071 0.071 0.286 -1.032 0.143
Sichuan 0.400 0.400 0.385 0.269 -0.049 0.354
Guizhou 0.379 0.345 0.310 0.379 -0.128 0.353
Yunnan 0.571 0.536 0.607 0.607 0.790 0.580
Shaanxi 0.417 0.313 0.417 0.250 -0.095 0.349
Gansu 0.583 0.417 0.500 0.250 0.301 0.438
Qinghai  0.667 0.000 0.333 0.333 -0.217 0.333
Ningxia 0.429 0.429 0.429 0.429 0.188 0.429
Xinjiang 0.529 0.412 0.588 0.412 0.445 0.485
Across Firm Size 
Small (bottom quarter) 0.610 0.586 0.610 0.476 0.816 0.573
Medium (second quarter) 0.412 0.364 0.420 0.382 0.059 0.395
Large (third quarter) 0.275 0.242 0.309 0.292 -0.422 0.279
Very Large (top quarter) 0.245 0.181 0.218 0.265 -0.643 0.228
Across Firm Age 
Less than 10 years 0.299 0.260 0.300 0.328 -0.357 0.297
More than 10 years 0.384 0.332 0.382 0.336 -0.084 0.359
Mean 0.351 0.304 0.351 0.333 -0.188 0.335
 
Table 4: Summary statistics of key variables 
 
Variable Obs Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max 
Operations Decisions 3074 0.402 0.490 0.000 1.000
Wages and Benefits 3071 0.351 0.477 0.000 1.000
HRM Decisions 3069 0.394 0.489 0.000 1.000
Long-term Development 3049 0.383 0.486 0.000 1.000
Family Firm_pc 3033 0.000 1.650 -1.548 2.503
Family Firm_average 3033 0.383 0.396 0.000 1.000
Contract Enforcement 862 0.860 0.348 0.000 1.000
Education 3077 12.978 3.063 5.000 19.000
Age 3053 43.946 8.119 7.000 76.000
Gender 3079 1.112 0.315 1.000 2.000
CPC Membership 3084 0.176 0.381 0.000 1.000
CPPCC Membership 3084 0.351 0.477 0.000 1.000
Firm Size 2774 6.344 1.735 0.693 13.911
Firm Age 3069 2.369 0.557 0.000 3.611
Entrepreneurship of Family Members 3084 0.047 0.140 0.000 1.000
Diversification 2936 0.337 0.644 0.000 3.000
Difficult to Find Reliable Managers 3025 0.669 0.471 0.000 1.000
 
Table 5: Benchmark results 
 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 
 Dependent Variable 
Operations 
Decisions 
Wages and 
Benefits 
HRM 
Decisions 
Long-term 
Development
Family 
Firm_pc 
Family 
Firm_average
Contract Enforcement -0.475*** -0.477*** -0.457*** -0.504*** -0.725*** -0.181*** 
 (-3.29) (-3.03)  (-2.69)  (-3.92) (-3.28) (-3.44) 
Controls       
Logarithm of GDP per capita -0.332*** -0.314*** -0.302*** -0.044 -0.365*** -0.083*** 
 (-4.35) (-3.65) (-3.99) (-0.64) (-4.43) (-4.23) 
Chi2/F-statistic for Industry Dummies [31.23]*** [24.95]** [26.29]*** [22.24]** [4.61]*** [4.92]*** 
Number of Observations 825 825 824 825 816 816 
Pseudo R2/R-squared 0.0581 0.0563 0.0525 0.0387 0.0864 0.0864 
Wald chi2/F-statistic 58.25 46.13 49.21 39.21 6.96 6.96 
p-value  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0003 0.0000 0.0000 
Note: Probit regressions are used in Columns 1-4 whereas ordinary-least-squares regressions are used in Columns 5-6. t-values, clustered at the 
industry/region level, are reported in the parenthesis. *, **, *** represent statistical significance at 10%, 5%, 1% respectively. 
 
Table 6: Multivariate analysis 
 
  1 2 3 4 5 
Dependent Variable 
Family 
Firm_pc 
Family 
Firm_pc 
Family 
Firm_pc 
Family 
Firm_average
Family 
Firm_average
Contract Enforcement -0.558** -0.622*** -0.726*** -0.159*** -0.184*** 
  (-2.53) (-2.84) (-3.03)  (-3.06)  (-3.25) 
Controls      
Logarithm of GDP per capita -0.278*** -0.147  -0.031  
 (-3.04) (-1.57)  (-1.40)  
F-statistic for Industry Dummies [3.40]*** [3.81]***  [3.93]***  
F-statistic for Industry * Region Dummies   [228.13]***  [225.63]*** 
Firm Owner’s Human Capital      
Education -0.106*** -0.081*** -0.110*** -0.019*** -0.026*** 
 (-5.16) (-3.76) (-4.78) (-3.66) (-4.67) 
Age 0.017*** 0.012** 0.011 0.003** 0.003* 
 (2.65) (1.77) (1.56) (2.01) (1.83) 
Gender 0.196 0.262 0.265 0.073 0.073 
 (0.94) (1.20) (1.17) (1.43) (1.39) 
Firm Owner’s Political Capital      
CPC Membership -0.217 0.005 0.019 -0.000 0.004 
 (-1.45) (0.03) (0.12) (-0.01) (0.11) 
CPPCC Membership 0.063 0.115 0.090 0.029 0.024 
 (0.52) (1.00) (0.70) (1.05) (0.79) 
Firm Characteristics      
Firm Size  -0.262*** -0.251*** -0.063*** -0.060*** 
  (-7.60) (-7.24) (-7.57) (-7.20) 
Firm Age  0.091 0.089 0.018 0.018 
  (1.02) (0.98) (0.86) (0.85) 
Number of Observations 810 739 739 739 739 
R-squared 0.1440 0.2242 0.2674 0.2257 0.2638 
F-statistic 21.27 19.56 . 19.38 . 
p-value 0.0000  0.0000 . 0.0000 . 
Note:  t-values, clustered at the industry/region level, are reported in the parenthesis. *, **, *** represent statistical significance at 10%, 5%, 
1% respectively. 
 
Table 7: Region-level analysis 
 
  1 2 
Dependent Variable 
Family 
Firm_pc 
Family 
Firm_average 
Contract Enforcement -1.270*** -0.297*** 
  (-3.17) (-3.21) 
Controls   
Logarithm of GDP per capita -0.123 -0.026 
 (-1.26) (-1.13) 
F-statistic for Industry Dummies [3.80]*** [3.92]*** 
Firm Owner’s Human Capital   
Education -0.082*** -0.019*** 
 (-3.98) (-3.92) 
Age 0.012* 0.003** 
 (1.86) (2.09) 
Gender 0.249 0.069 
 (1.13) (1.35) 
Firm Owner’s Political Capital   
CPC Membership -0.020 -0.006 
 (-0.13) (-0.15) 
CPPCC Membership 0.025 0.008 
 (0.23) (0.29) 
Firm Characteristics   
Firm Size -0.261*** -0.063*** 
 (-7.75) (-7.69) 
Firm Age 0.098 0.020 
 (1.07) (0.90) 
Number of Observations 739 739 
R-squared 0.2219 0.2204 
F-statistic 19.18 19.17 
p-value 0.0000  0.0000 
Note: t-values, clustered at the industry/region level, are reported in the parenthesis. 
*, **, *** represent statistical significance at 10%, 5%, 1% respectively. 
Table 8: Instrumental variable estimation 
 
  1 2 3 4 5 
Estimation 
Panel A, Second Stage of 
TSLS OLS 
Panel A, Second Stage of 
TSLS 
Dependent Variable 
Family 
Firm_pc 
Family 
Firm_average 
Family 
Firm_pc 
Family 
Firm_pc Family Firm_pc 
Contract Enforcement -1.984* -0.469*  -0.706*** -2.163*** 
   (-1.75)  (-1.75)   (-3.26) (-4.51) 
British Administration   -0.182** -0.116  
   (-2.35) (-1.10)  
Controls      
Logarithm of GDP per capita -0.284*** -0.064*** -0.161*** -0.360*** -0.273*** 
 (-2.85) (-2.73) (-2.62) (-4.34) (-3.16) 
Chi2/F-statistic for Industry Dummies [69.05]*** [74.39]*** [4.59]*** [4.61]*** [68.62]*** 
 
Panel B, First Stage of TSLS 
Dependent Variable 
Contract Enforcement  
Panel B, First Stage of TSLS 
Dependent Variable 
Contract Enforcement 
British Administration 0.091*** 0.091***    
 (2.86) (2.86)    
Regional Average of Other Firms’ Responses     0.818*** 
     (9.95) 
 
Panel C, Various First Stage 
Tests  
Panel C, Various First Stage 
Tests 
Anderson Canonical Correlation LR Statistic [12.85]*** [12.85]***   [26.87]*** 
Shea Partial R-squared 0.0148 0.0148   0.1351 
Cragg-Donald F-Statistic 13.36 13.36   42.41 
No. of Observations 816 816 816 816 816 
Note: t-values, clustered at the industry/region level, are reported in the parenthesis. *, **, *** represent statistical significance at 10%, 5%, 1% respectively. The 
first stages of TSLS have the same controls as those in the second stage of TSLS but their results are not reported to save space (available upon request).  
Table 9: Sample attrition issue 
 
  1 2 3 4 
Estimation OLS WLS 
Dependent Variable 
Family 
Firm_pc 
Family 
Firm_average
Family 
Firm_pc 
Family 
Firm_average
Contract Enforcement -0.625*** -0.160*** -0.881*** -0.222*** 
  (-2.90) (-3.12) (-4.09) (-4.34) 
Probability of Mis-reporting -0.581 -0.131   
 (-0.90) (-0.87)   
Probability of Mis-reporting ^ 2 0.594 0.146   
 (1.50) (1.57)   
Controls     
Logarithm of GDP per capita -0.168* -0.036* -0.387*** -0.089 
 (-1.96) (-1.75) (-3.96) (-3.76) 
F-statistic for Industry Dummies [4.26]*** [4.28]*** [4.94]*** [5.18]*** 
Number of Observations 741 741 741 741 
R-squared 0.2131 0.2137 0.1033 0.1047 
F-statistic 15.29 14.91 7.14 7.40 
p-value 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 
Note: t-values, clustered at the industry/region level, are reported in the parenthesis. *, **, *** represent 
statistical significance at 10%, 5%, 1% respectively. 
Table 10: Sub-sample 
 
  1 2 
Dependent Variable 
Family 
Firm_pc 
Family 
Firm_average 
Contract Enforcement -0.735** -0.175** 
 (-2.56) (-2.55) 
Controls   
Logarithm of GDP per capita -0.439** -0.098** 
 (-2.25) (-2.09) 
F-statistic for Industry Dummies [2.20]** [2.10]** 
No. of Observations 307 307 
R-squared 0.1041 0.1009 
F-statistics 3.22 3.06 
p-value for F-statistics  0.0002  0.0004 
Note: t-values, clustered at the industry/region level, are reported in the parenthesis. *, **, *** 
represent statistical significance at 10%, 5%, 1% respectively. 
 
Table 11: Controls for other explanations 
 
  1 2 3 4 5 
Dependent Variable 
Family 
Firm_pc 
Family 
Firm_pc 
Family 
Firm_pc 
Family 
Firm_pc 
Family 
Firm_average
Contract Enforcement -0.727*** -0.677*** -0.674*** -0.626*** -0.156*** 
  (-3.32)  (-3.09)  (-3.06)  (-2.88)  (-3.01) 
Entrepreneurship of Family Members -0.469   -0.459 -0.104 
 (-1.12)   (-1.14) (-1.08) 
Diversification  -0.251***  -0.256*** -0.061*** 
  (-3.50)  (-3.55) (-3.61) 
Difficult to Find Reliable Managers   0.576*** 0.603*** 0.156*** 
   (5.59) (5.94) (6.32) 
Controls      
Logarithm of GDP per capita -0.367*** -0.406*** -0.353*** -0.394*** -0.089*** 
 (-4.48) (-4.62) (-4.18) (-4.41) (-4.19) 
F-statistic for Industry Dummies [4.70]*** [8.47]*** [3.38]*** [2.97]*** [2.75]*** 
No. of Observations 816 816 806 806 806 
R-squared 0.0877 0.0994 0.1168 0.1321 0.1372 
F-statistics 6.61 32.61 8.31 26.13 22.69 
p-value for F-statistics  0.0000  0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 
Note: t-values, clustered at the industry/region level, are reported in the parenthesis. *, **, *** represent statistical significance at 10%, 5%, 1% respectively. 
 
